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Air Transport and the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
Martin Staniland 
 
               
Introduction: 
 
  In July 2006, a remarkable public exchange took place between a bishop and an airline 
executive.    Referring  to  the  contribution  of  aviation  emissions  to  global  warming,  Richard 
Chartres, the Bishop of London, declared in a Sunday sermon that it was time for people to 
“tread more lightly on the earth.” In particular, they should change their travel behavior so as to 
reduce emissions of CO2   by airliners. Not doing so, the bishop argued, would be spiritually 
offensive: 
 
  Making selfish choices such as flying on holiday or buying a large car are a 
  symptom of sin. Sin is not just a restricted list of moral mistakes. It is living a life  
  turned in on itself where people ignore the consequences of their actions.
1 
 
  The bishop’s sermon drew a characteristically salty response from Michael O’Leary, the 
CEO of the highly-successful low-cost airline Ryanair. O’Leary responded sarcastically that the 
bishop  was  obviously  trying  to  increase  his  depleted  congregation  by  giving  melodramatic 
sermons.  Pointing  out  that  a  sharp  reduction  in  air  travel  would  cause  “a  twenty  percent 
unemployment rate in the tourist industry,” O’Leary  concluded:  “God  bless  the  bishop.  The 
bishops  have  got  their  own  crosses  to  bear.  Goodness  knows  what  he  would  know  about 
greenhouse gases. He was obviously at some dinner party with the chatterati.”
2  
 
  This exchange vividly illustrates the increasingly strident and polarized debate that has 
developed within  the European  Union (EU) about aviation emissions.  Critics of the airline 
industry  (notably  those  associated  with  the  environmental  NGOs)  have  become  ever  more 
passionate about the atmospheric damage caused by air travel and ever more radical about the 
measures they believe should be taken to stop this damage. Suggestions for such measures have 
included the compulsory labeling of airline tickets with warnings about the pollution caused by 
aircraft emissions and the imposition of an annual ration for individual air travel. 
 
  The airline industry has been thrown onto the defensive by this unaccustomed tide of 
hostility, which has prompted one leader of the industry to worry that air transport is in danger of 
becoming “public enemy no.1 after tobacco.”
3 The industry is now acutely aware of the serious 
political and public relations challenge it faces. While proclaiming its commitment to “green” 
solutions, the industry has had to act expeditiously but carefully to ensure adoption of the best – 
or the least bad – of the limited range of political responses now available for coping with the 
emissions problem.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Clement (2006). 
2 Clement (2006). 
3 Thompson (2006, 34).  2 
 
Approaches to containing aircraft emissions: 
 
As a policy matter, a key difference between smoking and air transport is that while the 
impact  of  smoking  is  (at  least  immediately)  on  individuals  and  their  health,  the  impact  of 
aviation emissions is unavoidably systemic, and quite fundamentally so. Consequently, those 
arguing  about  a  suitable  strategy  to  contain  and,  if  possible,  reduce  the  impact  of  aircraft 
emissions agree that, since the air transport industry is global in scope, any successful strategy 
for  reducing  aircraft  emissions  must  ultimately  also  be  global  in  form,  global  in  its  legal 
authority and global in the political support it enjoys.  
 
But the participants in this debate differ about the appropriate regulatory framework for 
controlling and reducing emissions. In particular, the EU and its trading partners in international 
aviation (most vocally, the United States) differ about the appropriate jurisdiction for developing 
such a framework. The EU has taken the initiative to create its own regional scheme through 
recent  legislation that  adds  air  transport to  the  industries covered  by the  Emissions  Trading 
Scheme (ETS) it launched in 2005 in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
The United States and the overwhelming majority of other non-EU states, by contrast, 
oppose regional schemes (at least in the long term), arguing that authority for developing a 
global emissions scheme was given by the Kyoto Protocol to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization  (ICAO),  a  specialized  agency  of  the  United  Nations.
4  Since  1996,  ICAO  has, 
indeed, been trying to find a formula that will be acceptable to all 188 of its members. 
  
The  EU  and  the  US  also  differ  about  the  terms  for  participating  in  any  scheme  for 
regulating  aircraft  emissions.  The  EU  favors  making  participation  mandatory  for  all  airlines 
falling within the jurisdiction of such a scheme: indeed, under the recent ETS legislation it is 
applying this approach to all airlines flying into and out of EU airports – not, that is, only to 
airlines based in its 27 Member States.  By contrast, the overwhelming majority of the non-EU 
members of ICAO (including the United States) insist that any international scheme for reducing 
aircraft emissions must, following the UN’s usual voting principles, be adopted and implemented 
voluntarily by each member state of ICAO. 
 
More broadly, the various contributors (including the airlines) differ substantively about 
the best strategy for reducing emissions. Some would prefer to rely mainly or exclusively on the 
market  and  the  price  signals  shaped  by  a  cap-and  trade  system  such  as  the  ETS.  Others 
(especially  participants  in  the  airline  and  aerospace  industries)  emphasize  the  potential  of 
technical innovation, as well as operational and commercial actions by the airlines, for solving or 
at  least  reducing  the  problem.  Yet  others  (especially  the  environmental  NGOs)  prefer  to 
emphasize voluntary actions by members of the traveling public in order to curb demand for air 
travel and to popularize other means of transport. Finally, some still see “command-and-control” 
actions by governments (notably through the imposition of taxes or even rationing) as useful 
instruments for reducing emissions.  
                                                 
4 Article 2 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol prescribes that the parties to the Protocol “shall pursue limitation or reduction 
of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation …working through the 
International Civil Aviation Organization.” For some comments on the ambiguities of this wording, see Petersen 
(2008), 201-4. 3 
 
While these approaches entail real differences in emphasis and philosophy, they are not 
necessarily  mutually  exclusive.  Indeed,  many  people  concerned  with  the  emissions  problem 
argue that a solution will depend on combining two or more approaches - say, combining the 
development of aircraft and engines that cause fewer emissions with shaping the market through 
the ETS.   
 
  This paper examines the EU’s strategy for containing aircraft emissions as embodied in 
the new legislation on aviation emissions, as well as criticisms of this strategy and the political 
and technical problems it faces. The paper discusses in turn: 
 
1.  The nature of the aircraft emissions problem; 
2.  The principles and operation of the Emissions Trading Scheme; 
3.  The development of an EU strategy to cope with aviation emissions;  
4.  The attitudes of major stakeholders within and outside Europe to the emissions problem;  
5.  The attitudes of these stakeholders (and the responses of the EU institutions) to the more 
contentious issues that emerged in discussion of the Commission’s proposals for 
including commercial aviation in the ETS; and 
6.  The prospects for the EU’s strategy and – more broadly – for the development of a 
global regime to control and, if possible, reduce the contribution of aviation emissions to 
global warming. 
 
 
1. Air transport and global warming: 
 
  Aviation is - in static and quantitative terms - a minor culprit in global warming.  Until 
recently, most estimates have suggested that air transport produces between 3% and 4% of global 
CO2  emissions  (the  European  Commission  usually  cites  similar  percentages  for  the  EU).
5 
Consequently, the industry’s defenders invariably complain that air transport is being blamed 
disproportionately and targeted excessively, given the much greater pollution committed by other 
industries (and other forms of transportation, notably road vehicles and even ships). 
 
            But critics of the airline industry argue that aircraft emissions, compared to other kinds of 
pollution,  are  especially  harmful  to  the  environment.  Unlike  other  atmospheric  polluters,  jet 
airliners emit CO2 (as well as nitrous oxides and water vapor) high into the atmosphere, at 
cruising  altitudes  typically  between  30,000  and  40,000  feet.  Even  more  seriously,  these 
greenhouse gas emissions survive in the upper atmosphere for as much as a hundred years. 
                                                 
5 Commission of the European Communities (2006A, 66).  Another source suggests that the relevant 
figure was roughly four per cent for the EU when it had only fifteen members, but had dropped 
significantly with the accession of central and eastern European states, in which air transport was less 
developed (and pollution from industrial sources was greater) (Frontier Economics 2006, Executive 
summary, 1). The Association of European Airlines (AEA) estimates that in 2003 intra- and extra- EU 
flights generated 3.4% of total CO2 emissions within the EU and 0.5% of global CO2 emissions (AEA 
2006).  
 4 
 
Finally, the total impact of aviation on the atmosphere is much greater than simple figures for 
CO2 emissions suggest – perhaps as much as four times greater.
6 
  
  This impact has been growing significantly over the past two decades. One very recent 
report suggests, indeed, that aviation may be the cause of as much as 4.9% of global warming.
7 
Such growth in emissions reflects a steep growth in traffic and a dramatic multiplication of 
routes served – both resulting from liberalization of air transport within the EU. Between 1990 
and 2003, even as total greenhouse gas emissions from EU sources fell, total CO2 emissions by 
EU-based  airlines  grew  by  73%.
8  Rapid  growth  is  continuing  with  liberalization  and  the 
development  of  low-cost  air  travel  in  eastern  Europe  as  well  as  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin 
America.
9  
 
 
2. How the ETS works: 
 
  The EU developed its Emissions Trading Scheme in response to its commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gases (principally carbon dioxide (CO2)). The first 
phase  of  the  ETS  (between  2005  and  2007)  covered  over  11,000  ground-based  sources  of 
atmospheric pollution, such as power stations.
10  
 
  The principles governing the ETS are those used in established “cap-and-trade” systems 
for  controlling  atmospheric  pollution.
11  Such  systems  offer  choices  to  firms  responsible  for 
pollution, along with incentives and disincentives. Each firm in a designated industry receives an 
initial annual allocation of the pollutant concerned (in this case, CO2). The size of this allocation 
is  based  on  (but  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as)  the  firm’s  current  level  of  pollution.  Each 
allocation consists of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), each representing one ton of CO2. 
 
  Having  received  its  allocation  of  AAUs,  the  firm  may  choose  (or  be  compelled  for 
technical reasons) to exceed its allocation of AAUs. If it does so, it will have to buy additional 
AAUs equivalent to its excess pollution through a commercial carbon market. Alternatively, the 
firm may try to reduce its emissions below the level of its initial allocation of AAUs. It may then 
                                                 
6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that the total impact of aviation on 
the atmosphere was between two and four times greater than the cumulative emission of  CO2 by the 
industry since its start (IPCC 1999, quoted in Commission of the European Communities 2006A, 12). 
7 This figure (given in Transport and Environment 2009) refers to 2005 (whereas an IPCC estimate given 
by the IPCC in 2007 was based on data from 2000). 
8 Figures given in CE Delft (2005) and Commission of the European Communities (2006B, 2), 
respectively.  By early 2005 – with a further growth of traffic of 7.5% in 2004 – total CO2 emissions by 
commercial aircraft had grown by 87% relative to the 1990 figure.  By contrast, total CO2 emissions 
within the EU fell by 5.3% between 1990 and 2003: thus, while such emissions fell by 287 million tons 
during this period, those of the airline industry rose by 47 million tons.  
9 Between 2000 and 2007, passenger air traffic increased by 38% (Transport and Environment 2009). 
10 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, 13 October 2003, 
setting up “a scheme for greenhouse gas emission trading within the Community.” In its first phase, the 
ETS was applied to over 50% of CO2  emitted within the EU. 
11 The best-known example being the scheme adopted to deal with the North American acid rain problem. 5 
 
sell its surplus AAUs in the carbon market and thereby profit from its successful abatement of 
emissions. 
 
  Cap-and-trade thus seeks to achieve reduction of emissions in the most efficient manner 
and at the lowest cost by appealing to the economic interests of the polluter.  By establishing a 
market  mechanism,  it  should  in  principle  achieve  such  a  reduction  virtually  without  the 
intervention of government, except as legislator and as monitor of the scheme.   
 
 
3. Aviation emissions on the EU’s agenda: 
 
  The EU’s initiative to develop its own proposals for dealing with the aviation emissions 
problem was largely prompted by the slow progress made by ICAO in framing a comprehensive, 
universal and mandatory formula for controlling such emissions on international flights. Another 
factor was growing public awareness in Europe – fuelled by some very active NGOs – of the 
several kinds of environmental damage associated with air travel. 
 
The first suggestion for action by the EU to deal with aircraft emissions came in 1999 – 
the same year that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its study of 
the atmospheric impact of air transport (the first such study of a particular industry).
12 Following 
the EU’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, the Commission and stakeholders in air 
transport considered what kind of action would deal most effectively with aircraft emissions. 
One option was to resort to measures of a “command-and-control” variety which would, for 
example,  impose  taxes  and  other  charges  on  the  industry  or  would  set  direct  limits  on  its 
operation and growth.
13  
 
After  consultation  and  some  internal  debate,  the  Commission  decided  to  reject  the 
“command-and-control”  option  in  favor  of  one  relying  on  a  “market-based  instrument.” 
Specifically,  the  Commission  decided  that  it  would  recommend  including  aviation  in  the 
emissions  trading  scheme  that  the  EU  was  then  setting  up  for  ground-based  sources  of 
atmospheric pollution.
14 This decision was supported by a feasibility study (published in July 
2005) which concluded that inclusion of commercial aviation in the ETS would be the most cost-
effective way to tackle the emissions problem. In September 2005, the Commission followed up 
with a Communication which explained its preference for this course of action. 
 
  During the fall of 2005, both the European Parliament (with particular enthusiasm) and 
the  Council  of  Environmental  Ministers  endorsed  this  approach,  which  was  spelled  out  in 
detailed legislative proposals for including commercial aviation in the second phase of the ETS  
                                                 
12 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1999). The Commission declared that “the 
long-term policy target must be to achieve improvements to the environmental performance of air 
transport operations that outweigh the environmental impact of growth” (Commission of the European 
Communities 1999, 2).  
13 Commission of the European Communities (2005).   
14 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, 13 October 2003, 
setting up “a scheme for greenhouse gas emission trading within the Community.”  6 
 
that were presented by the Commission in October 2006.
15 These proposals have since moved 
through the EU legislative process, acquiring various amendments on the way.
16 In December 
2008, the legislation was finally adopted following agreement between the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers and took effect on 2 February 2009. 
 
 
4. The approaches of major stakeholders: 
 
  The process of drafting and reviewing the Commission’s proposals was accompanied by 
some  very  active  lobbying,  as  might  be  expected  over  an  issue  pitching  an  economically 
important industry against some increasingly aroused environmental NGOs.  In the following 
sections, we examine the attitudes of the EU airlines, the NGOs and non-EU states and their 
airlines to the problem of aviation emissions. 
 
 
a. EU airlines: 
 
The European airlines and organizations representing them - principally, the Association 
of European Airlines (AEA) and the European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA) -have 
responded to the global warming issue in essentially two ways. One is political. It involves 
defending their own record, questioning the assumptions and content of the new legislation and 
proposing changes that, in their view, will reduce the burden of the ETS on the industry while 
enabling  commercial  aviation  to  continue  growing.    Public  policy  should  therefore  (in  the 
opinion of the AEA) seek “a healthy balance between economic progress and environmental 
responsibility.”
17  
 
The other kind of response is strategic: it involves looking for and adopting operational, 
technological and commercial improvements and innovations that the airlines hope will reduce 
the quantity and impact of emissions from their aircraft.  
 
  In political debate, the position of the airline industry on its role in global warming has 
typically involved three arguments. First, it stresses that commercial aviation is responsible for a 
very small portion of the CO2 pumped into the EU’s atmosphere, compared to the contributions 
of fixed sources of pollution (such as power stations and heavy manufacturing plants) and other 
kinds of transportation.  
 
  Secondly,  the  industry  points  to  its  central  role  in  the  international  economy:  more 
specifically, it claims (again in the words of the AEA) that air transport is “an indispensable 
                                                 
15 In November 2005, the Parliament supported strong environmental controls over civil aviation and the 
imposition of a tax on kerosene (the standard fuel for jet aircraft). In July 2006, the Parliament adopted 
(by 439 votes to 71) a Resolution welcoming the Commission’s Communication of September 2005 on 
the inclusion of aviation in the ETS, with some MEPs still arguing for a kerosene tax and the creation of a 
separate ETS for aviation (rather than its inclusion in the existing scheme). 
16 Procedurally, the legislation takes the form of an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC (see above). 
17 AEA, 2006. 7 
 
instrument for Europe’s growth” and for the economic competitiveness of the EU. 
18 As an 
airline-industry sponsored report noted, the airline industry supports service industries (such as 
tourism) which are, in the report’s words, “a highly productive part of the European economy 
[whose] growth leads to important knock-on benefits for the wider economy.”
19 Thirdly, the 
airlines  point  to  the  increasing  importance  of  air  transport  and  associated  industries  as 
employers.
20   
 
  Consequently,  while  the  European  airlines  emphasize  their  strong  commitment  to 
protecting the environment, they also oppose measures that would seriously curtail their growth. 
They  especially  oppose  measures  that  in  their  view,  though  presented  as  environmentally-
beneficial, have no demonstrable impact on CO2 emissions, but are in effect forms of covert 
taxation that raise airlines’ costs while increasing governments’ revenues.  The airlines believe 
that they have become – unfairly and too frequently – a favorite target for the imposition by 
Member State governments of revenue-earning taxes which raise the total cost of tickets and 
thereby threaten the competitive positions of EU airlines vis-à-vis their non-EU rivals. 
 
  Thus when the EU resolved to act on the issue of airline emissions, the airlines – faced 
with the alternatives of new taxes and “economic  instruments” (specifically, inclusion in the 
ETS)  -  emphatically  if  grudgingly  opted  for  the  latter.    But  they  quickly  added  and  have 
repeatedly stressed that any economic instrument “should have a clear environmental rather than 
fiscal objective.”
21  
 
  The solutions actively emphasized by the airline industry involve looking for operational, 
technological  and  commercial  improvements.  All  such  improvements  are  appealing  to  the 
airlines for at least three reasons. One (the most obvious) is that any reduction in “fuel burn” or 
any way of using fuel more efficiently will help their - typically fragile – budgets. Secondly, 
most of the benefits of such improvements will be available immediately and - even better - 
usually at very low cost to the airlines (in contrast to the investments imposed on the power-
generators by emissions abatement rules).  Thirdly, with the exception of changes in air traffic 
                                                 
18 AEA, 2006. Pointing out that the average distance between Europe’s capitals and Brussels is 1,138 
kms, the AEA has also claimed that air transport is crucial to “strengthening Europe’s cohesion, 
integration, prosperity and political importance.” 
19 Frontier Economics (2006, executive summary, 2). The Commission does not dismiss the industry’s 
claims about its economic importance or its wish to grow further, but argues that “emissions attributable 
to aviation will have to be de-coupled from aviation growth in order that emissions stabilization can take 
place followed by emissions reductions” (Commission of the European Communities 2006A, 7). 
20 The AEA has claimed that air transport directly employs some 400,000 people within the EU; 
indirectly, when the staff of airports and related services are included, as many as 3.1 million jobs may 
depend on the industry. Globally, (again according to the AEA), “more than 7.5 million jobs depend on 
air transport, through direct, indirect, induced and catalytic impacts” and  “25% of all companies’ sales 
depend on air transport and almost 60% state air connections have a significant impact on their business” 
(AEA 2006). Much depends on how broadly “aviation” and “related services” are defined. Some 
definitions include all aerospace activities. In the UK, for example, 180,000 jobs are said to have 
depended directly (and another 200,000 indirectly) on “aviation” in 1998 (Frontier Economics 2006, 22).  
Airports alone employed 1.4 million workers in the Member States of the EU in 2004 (Airports Council 
International, 2004). 
21 AEA (2006).  8 
 
management, virtually all of the actions required would depend on and would be controlled by 
the airlines themselves.  From the industry’s point of view, such a formula is naturally far more 
attractive  than  any  formula  entailing  more  regulation,  especially  the  type  and  degree  of 
regulation that their critics have been demanding. 
 
Operational decisions consist of those made by airline managers, airport officials and 
pilots in order to reduce consumption of fuel (and therefore emissions of CO2) on scheduled 
flights.
22 These decisions are about such matters as changes in flight procedure, improvements in 
air traffic management and more efficient taxiing by aircraft at airports. While in flight, aircraft 
might be flown at lower speeds and brought in to land without circling above airports and might 
use a “continuous descent approach” rather than the conventional “drive-and-dive” approach.
23  
 
  Improvements  in  air  traffic  management  (a  high  priority  for  airlines)  would  include 
adoption of shorter and more direct routes, allowing pilots more individual choice of routes, 
more efficient spacing of aircraft and better communication and coordination between air traffic 
control centers.
24 Fuel consumption on the ground could be cut by taxiing with reduced engine 
power, devising shorter routes for taxiing and (most of all) reducing waits for the use of runways. 
Through such operational changes (the airlines claim) fuel use and emissions could be reduced 
dramatically and efficiency could be increased – in many cases at little or no cost.
25   
 
  Technological changes typically involve the development of more efficient engines, the 
use of less polluting fuels and the design of airframes that are lighter and aerodynamically more 
efficient  than  those  currently  in  service.  Substantial  research  work  by  aerospace  firms, 
government and private research organizations is now under way to make commercial aircraft 
more efficient and less polluting. Indeed, the airlines readily point out the progress toward a 
cleaner and more efficient technology that the industry and its suppliers have made in the last 
forty years.  As a result, emissions from airliners have declined by 70% since 1975 and the EU 
airlines currently invest 14% of their turnover in research.
26  
 
  At its most optimistic, the implication of this view is that equally dramatic technological 
progress in the coming years (combined with the savings achieved by more efficient operations) 
will  enable  the  airlines  to  stay  within  or  at  least  close  to  their  carbon  allowances,  thereby 
substantially reducing the need for them to purchase carbon in the market. Those taking this view 
even  argue  that  operational  and  technical  improvements  can  reduce  pollution  so  much  that 
mandated  reduction  of  emissions  (exemplified  by  the  EU’s  legislation)  will  be  unnecessary.  
                                                 
22 A consultant’s report on aviation and global warming in 2006 distinguished between “operational” 
decisions and “strategic” decisions (those “made in the medium to long-term by airline management” 
regarding the deployment of a company’s resources, both material and human) (Frontier Economics 2006, 
40).  
23 That is, aircraft would come in to land on a continually-descending slope of 3° rather than through a 
series of steps, each at an altitude determined by air traffic control.  
24 A recent consultant’s report estimates that improved air traffic management alone could yield an 8.4% 
reduction in fuel burn (Frontier Economics, 2006, 42). 
25 The AEA has estimated that improvements in air traffic management and other operational measures 
could reduce consumption of fuel by between 8% and 18% (AEA 2006). 
26 AEA (2006). 9 
 
Indeed, they claim that already “technological and operational progress has made it possible to 
decouple aviation growth from higher fuel consumption.” 
27 
 
  Commercial measures concern the ways in which an airline can use its resources more 
efficiently, reduce its costs and liabilities and, with luck or skill, ultimately balance its books. For 
example,  an  airline  might  decide to  operate  fewer  flights,  fly  on  fewer  routes  or  use larger 
aircraft with more seats. To compensate for any loss of passengers due to such measures, it might 
also increase fares. The immediate purpose of these initiatives would be to ensure the survival 
and profitability of a company by operating in the most economically efficient way, rather than 
to  achieve  larger  goals  of  protecting  the  environment.  However,  the  airlines  argue  that  - 
especially with moderation in the cost of fuel - profitability and “greener aviation” are not only 
mutually  compatible  but  actively  interdependent  goals.  No  party,  they  stress,  has  a  more 
compelling economic and commercial incentive to be “environmentally-friendly” than the airline 
industry itself. 
 
 
b. Non-governmental organizations: 
 
  Until the issue of global warming appeared, environmental activists (both in Europe and 
in the US) had largely restricted their campaigning about aviation to the problem of aircraft noise 
near airports and to the encroachment of airport expansion on rural areas.
28 
 
  Rising concern about global warming added a new and far broader issue to the charge list 
against air transport - namely, its contribution to the problem through the pumping of CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The emergence of this issue radically transformed 
and enlarged the debate about aviation’s environmental impact from one focused on localized 
nuisance to one powered by fear of the almost unimaginable implications and costs of climate 
change.  
 
  The environmental NGOs concerned with this problem have been of three kinds. The first 
group  consists  of  established  and  familiar  organizations  with  broadly-defined  environmental 
agendas;  the  second  consists  of  existing  NGOs  concerned  particularly  or  exclusively  with 
transport;  and  the  third  consists  of  new  organizations  set  up  more  recently  for  the  specific 
purpose of publicizing the damaging effects of aircraft on the atmosphere and campaigning for 
its reduction.  The three groups differ not only in the breadth and specificity of their agendas, but 
also in their strategies.  
 
  The familiar, established environmental NGOs (such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth 
and the World Wildlife Fund) tend to concentrate on lobbying directed at policy-making bodies, 
                                                 
27 AEA (2006). 
28 For example, the website for the British organization Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) notes 
that the group was founded in 1975 “because of growing concerns about noise from private aircraft” 
(www.aef.org.uk). 
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especially those in Brussels.
29 The second group - also focusing mainly on Brussels - are the 
existing  NGOs  concerned  with  transport  issues,  the  most  prominent  and  active  being  the 
European Federation for Transport and Environment (T and E) which claims to represent fifty-
one organizations in twenty-three European countries and which has observer status in two UN 
bodies.
30   
 
  The third group of organizations, while having opinions about the EU’s legislation, tends 
to  appeal  directly  to  citizens  within  individual  Member  States,  urging  them  to  take  action 
whether  individually  (for  instance,  by  reducing  or  giving  up  air  travel)  or  collectively  (for 
example, through demonstrations at airports in favor of limits on the use of existing runways and 
against new runways).  Such bodies (which might more aptly be described as campaigns) include 
GermanWatch  and  the  British-based  Aviation  Environment  Federation  (AEF),  as  well  as 
research and advocacy organizations such as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in 
the UK. Several of these organizations are actually federations of more local or more specialized 
bodies:  the  AEF,  for  example,  claims  to  have  120  members,  including  “community  and 
environmental  groups,  local  authorities,  parish  councils,  businesses  and  consultancies  and 
individuals.”
31 One AEF member, the former www.Flyless.org, while claiming not to be “anti-
industry  or  anti-flying,”  urged  citizens  to  reduce  the  environmental  impact  of  air  transport, 
notably by flying on vacation only once every three years.
32  
 
  The  almost-religious  fervor  of  environmentalists  about  global  warming  has,  as  noted 
above, been reflected in statements by some  church leaders. In 2004,  for  example,  a senior 
member of the Church of England noted that 75% of passengers using low-cost airlines were 
from the higher income groups and commented: 
 
  They could afford the imposition of taxes on aviation fuel which would regulate the 
  market. The principle is that the polluter pays. God entrusts the care of his  good  creation 
  to those made in His image. The challenge to Christians claiming faith is to think more 
                                                 
29 The range of such bodies was well illustrated by a letter to The Independent (London) in June 2006, 
calling on the British government to “fundamentally rethink its aviation policy so that it plays a part in 
making the annual cuts in emissions that are needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.” This 
letter was signed by representatives of ten environmental NGOs, including War on Want, the Campaign 
to Protect Rural England, Greenpeace UK, and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (Carmichael 
et al. 2006). 
30 Founded in 1989, T and E (which has headquarters in Brussels) has observer status at ICAO and 
Special Consultative Status at the U.N. Economic and Social Council. It is also the coordinator of the 
International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation (ICSA) which (apart from T and E) consists of the 
(British) Aviation Environment Federation, the Center for Clean Air Policy, the Coalition for Clean Air, 
the Dutch Society for Nature and Environment (SNM), Friends of the Earth-Europe, the German League 
for Nature and Environment (DNR), GermanWatch and the World Wildlife Fund-US. 
31 www.aef.org.uk, “History and membership.” 
32  Falconer (2005, 29, 31). Led by Jeff Gazzard, the organization assembled a “green list” of companies 
that have agreed to reduce their use of air transport (and a “red list” of those that have not done so). 
Gazzard asserted, nevertheless, that his organization was not trying to attack the industry, but was simply 
“anti-the impact of flying.” In 2006, a journalist observed that a no-flying movement was “beginning to 
take shape, with many people voluntarily committing not to fly at all on non-essential trips” (Lynas 2006, 
14). 11 
 
  than twice before booking flights. Avoid short-haul flights.  Is  our  time  more  precious 
  than the future of our grandchildren? May we, at least for leisure, limit ourselves to one 
  long-haul return flight a year?
33 
 
 
c. Non-EU governments and airlines: 
 
  Flights between the EU and non-EU states are governed (as are flights between non-EU 
states) by a very restrictive set of rules based on the premise that every state enjoys absolute 
sovereignty  over  national  airspace  (a  right  invoked  with  dramatic  effect  by  the  US  on  11 
September 2001).
34 The so-called “Chicago regime” (named after the Chicago Convention on 
International Aviation of 1944 and based on this premise of sovereignty) sustains a cumbersome 
system of bilateral air service agreements which prescribe the routes on which the airlines of the 
two countries in question may fly, the number of airlines that may fly on the designated routes 
and the frequency of such flights. The traffic rights thus created are then allocated by each 
signatory state to one or more of its national airlines.  
 
  Liberalization of the air transport market has caused some erosion and relaxation of the 
Chicago regime (and an associated system of fare coordination managed by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA)). The EU Member States abolished the bilaterals governing air 
services  between  them  while  establishing  the  single  market  in  air  transport  in  the  1990s. 
Moreover, after a long struggle, the Commission has now secured authority to negotiate bilateral 
agreements between the EU as an entity and non-EU “third countries” (such as the US).
35  
 
  But liberalization does not (and probably never will) reduce, qualify or challenge the 
sovereignty of every internationally- recognized state over its airspace. The EU Member States 
did not surrender such sovereignty when they created the EU single market, but rather gave 
unconditional access to their collective airspace to EU “Community carriers” for purposes of 
offering services at will between airports in Member States. Further, even so-called “open skies” 
agreements are essentially liberalized bilaterals, expanding traffic rights for the airlines of the 
two signatories but not extending them to airlines based in other countries.
36 
 
  Any effort to create an international regime for controlling aviation emissions would 
clearly have to take account of the attachment of states to sovereignty over national airspace. For 
                                                 
33 Christopher Hall, canon of the Oxford diocese of the Church of England (Hall 2004).  
34 An almost invariable result of such assertion of authority is that foreign airlines are forbidden from 
flying on domestic routes (the so-called “cabotage” rule). Thus, for example, British Airways may not 
under current rules operate scheduled services between, say, New York and Los Angeles (though it might 
combine both cities in a service starting or ending in London). However, under the 2007 open skies 
agreement between the EU and the US, American airlines acquired (in principle) the right to operate 
between (but not within) EU Member States, leading critics to charge that the agreement was unbalanced.  
35 The agreements negotiated between the EU and third countries supersede existing bilaterals between 
individual Member States and third countries. The political and legal struggle to secure authority for the 
Commission to negotiate with “third countries” is described in Staniland (2008, chapter 6).  
36 Thus the 2007 open skies agreement between the EU and the US simply allows EU and American 
airlines to choose the cities within the EU and the US between which they will offer flights, as well as to 
determine fares and frequencies on such routes according to their commercial judgment. 12 
 
most (if not all) non-EU states, the proper forum for developing such a regime is ICAO, pursuing 
its  mandate  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  rather  than  a  regional  body  such  as  the  EU.    They 
therefore  oppose  any  attempt  by  the  EU  to  apply  the  rules  of  the  ETS  to  non-EU  airlines, 
especially if it raises the possibility of financial costs and penalties for these airlines. 
 
 
5. Arguments about the legislation for including aviation in the ETS: 
 
 
a. Summary of the goals and content of the legislation: 
 
  Adding  air  transport  to  the  ETS  presented  two  novel  challenges  to  the  European 
Commission in preparing legislation to apply ETS principles to the industry.  One challenge 
arose from the simple difference between stationary and mobile sources of pollution: the other 
stemmed from the international nature of the airline industry.  All of the industries and plants 
covered by the first phase of the scheme were stationary and located exclusively within the 
boundaries of EU Member States. Air transport, by contrast, is intrinsically about mobility - the 
mobility of passengers and freight and the mobility of the vehicles carrying them. While all 
transportation  necessarily  involves  both  kinds  of  mobility,  air  transport  is  unusual  in  its 
geographical scope - specifically the degree to which its services involve frequent crossing of 
national boundaries and extensive passage over foreign territory and through jealously-guarded 
national airspace. The challenge facing the Commission was therefore how to devise rules that 
would simultaneously accommodate the commercial practices of the industry, achieve serious 
abatement of emissions and respect the jurisdictions over airspace entrenched in the Chicago 
regime.  
 
   Following the principles of the ETS, the legislation on aviation emissions is intended (in 
the words of a Commission staff document) to promote “better internalization of the external 
costs of climate change” and to provide “stronger incentives for air transport operators to reduce 
their impact on the climate.”
37 Its declared goal is to reduce by 2020 the annual CO2 emissions 
from commercial aircraft operating to and from EU airports to a level of roughly 218 million 
tons of CO2 (the average tonnage emitted by aircraft flying on commercial services within the 
EU between 2004 and 2006).
38 Such emissions had been expected to rise to 340 million by 2015 
and to 400 million by 2020. The legislation thus aims to reduce annual CO2 emissions from 
aircraft by at least 182 million tons by 2020. 
 
  To achieve such reductions, each airline (as an “accountable entity” within the ETS) will 
receive at the start of each five-year period a free allocation of AAUs (as noted above, tons of 
CO2). The size of each allocation of AAUs to an airline will be based on the average annual 
                                                 
37 Commission of the European Communities (2006A, 7). The 1999 Commission document said that “the 
long-term policy target must be to achieve improvements to the environmental performance of air 
transport operations that outweigh the environmental impact of growth” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1999).   
38 Reuters (2008). The Commission’s original estimate of this average was 161 million tons, with 
emissions rising (under various “business-as-usual” scenarios) to between 202 million and 286 million 
tons by 2020.  13 
 
emissions  of  CO2  by  the  aircraft  of  that  airline  in  the  period  2004-2006,  modified  by  a 
benchmark intended to award efficient operation. At the end of each year, the airline will be 
required to submit (“surrender”) AAUs equal to the tonnage of CO2 emitted by its aircraft during 
the past twelve months. 
 
  Following the general ETS rules, each airline will have to purchase extra AAUs in the 
carbon market if in a particular year it exceeds its allocation. Conversely, it may sell in the 
carbon  market  any  surplus  AAUs  it  accumulates  through  reduced  operation  and/or  greater 
efficiency.  
 
 
b. The major issues in debate and amendment: 
 
  The formula thus summarized was the result of a contentious process involving the major 
stakeholders in air transport. This process mainly turned on how to apply the general principles 
of the ETS (and its existing practice) to the particular character and circumstances of commercial 
aviation. Some  of  the questions  that arose in this process were quite easily resolved. These 
questions included the following:  
 
  To  which  gas  or  gases  should  the  legislation  apply?  The  unanimous  answer  to  this 
question was CO2, though some parties wanted to add nitrous oxide (always present in jet 
exhausts, but proportionately much smaller than CO2); 
 
  Who or what should be the “accountable entity”? A consensus favored designating the 
airlines as accountable entities (rather than, for example, airports, aircraft constructors or, 
indeed,  individual  passengers).  Since  airlines  are  directly  and  solely  responsible  for 
operating the aircraft emitting the CO2, all parties agreed that “aircraft operators” would 
be the appropriate “accountable entities” in the new legislation.
39 This was consistent 
with the logic (that the polluter should pay) that had earlier led to power-generating firms 
being held accountable for emissions from power stations; 
 
                                                 
39 Use of the term “aircraft operator” (rather than, say, “airline”) in practice expanded substantially the 
number and range of “accountable entities” under the legislation to include aircraft belonging to general 
aviation companies, corporations and non-profit organizations – all of which the Commission apparently 
decided  were engaged in some form of commercial aviation.  While the UK Department for Transport 
had earlier identified 52 EU-based airlines and 35 non-EU airlines that would be liable for emissions 
under the Commission’s proposals, the Commission published in February 2009 a list of over 2,700 non-
EU aircraft operators it had identified as liable because of their use of EU airports (all of which were 
assigned to individual Member States for purposes of monitoring emissions (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009)). The majority of these operators were not passenger-carrying airlines, but rather 
general aviation and cargo companies, corporations, and not-for-profit organizations. Belgium, for 
example, was given responsibility for 41 operators, including not only Brussels Airlines and VLM, but 
enterprises as unfamiliar to users of Travelocity or Expedia as Hewa Bora Airways of the Congo, Toyota 
Motor Europe, and Newell Rubbermaid. Bulgaria was assigned (among others) the Red Cross, MIG 
Russian Aircraft, and Yeti Airlines (sic) of Nepal. 
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  How might new airlines be able to obtain emissions allowances? What should happen to 
carbon allowances granted to airlines that go bankrupt?  
 
  Recognizing the dynamics of the airline industry, the EU institutions agreed that new 
entrants would have to buy the AAUs they expected would be necessary for their first year in 
business and would eventually receive their own allowances in the next cycle of allocations. The 
AAUs released through established airlines going out of business would, under the legislation, be 
held back (rather than being offered for sale in the carbon market) and would be cancelled when 
a new general allocation of allowances took place. 
 
  Who should monitor compliance, and how?   
 
  In  principle,  the  monitoring  of  aviation  emissions  (compared  to  that  involved  in 
monitoring power stations) is relatively simple, uncontroversial and immune to manipulation. 
Emissions can be deduced from the consumption of fuel by aircraft and such deduction is quite 
straightforward since the number of commercial aircraft and engine types in service is fairly 
small. Emissions can thus be determined by using a small set of standardized fuel consumption 
formulas  (for  particular  engines  and  aircraft  types).  Moreover,  records  of  fuel  purchase  by 
particular airlines are easily obtained and easily verified.   
 
  But the actual measurement of emissions requires some complicated calculations. For this 
purpose, the Commission has already undertaken technical consultations intended to explore the 
issues  involved  in  “monitoring,  reporting  and  evaluation”  (MRE)  and  to  create  detailed 
procedures for monitoring the emissions of individual aircraft operators.   
 
  Other  questions  raised  by  the  Commission’s  proposals  proved  to  be  chronically 
contentious and divisive. They included the following:   
 
  What should be the base year or years for determining the overall cap on emissions? 
 
  The Commission’s proposals on the question of a baseline year had recommended that 
the cap for air transport under the ETS should be derived from (though not necessarily equal to) 
the average of the total miles flown in 2004, 2005 and 2006 on flights to and from EU airports.   
 
  Several airlines and environmental NGOs challenged this recommendation. The airlines 
argued  that  2004-6  was  “too  far  removed  from  the  2011-2022  trading  period”:  2008  would 
therefore provide a better basis for calculating the cap. The NGOs, in contrast, wanted to push 
the baseline back as far as 1990 – consistent with the Kyoto agreement, but also seven years 
before  full  implementation  of  the  EU’s  liberalization  package  for  air  transport.    To  the 
disappointment of the NGOs, the Commission responded that rolling back the baseline as far 
back as 1990 was completely unrealistic and would destroy all the benefits of liberalization.
40 
Ultimately, the legislation incorporated the 2004-6 baseline proposed by the Commission. 
                                                 
40 The Commission said that in choosing the 2004-6 reference period, it had explicitly recognized that, 
given the extent to which aviation has grown since 1990, “the sector [could not] be expected to take on 
the same level of ambition as other sectors already covered by the ETS” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2006A, 63). 15 
 
  What should the cap be? 
 
  Procedurally, the 2004-6 average was only a basis for subsequent calculation and debate: 
the  actual  cap  for  emissions  by  commercial  aircraft  might  be  set  at  any  level  from  100% 
downward. The Commission therefore had to decide where to set this level.  Again in the face of 
more radical proposals by the environmental NGOs, it proposed that the cap should – at least 
initially - be set at 100% of the baseline 2004-6 amount.  
 
  Discussion in the Parliament and elsewhere produced widely different suggestions for the 
level of the cap. While the airlines endorsed the Commission’s proposal for a 100% cap, the 
Parliament’s environment committee considered lowering the cap to 75% or even 50% of the 
base figure (a percentage that the environmental NGOs supported).  But even the rapporteur of 
the committee (himself a strong advocate of reducing emissions) rejected the suggestion for a 
50% reduction as “technically and politically not achievable.”
41 His committee eventually fell 
back on a recommendation for a 90% cap, and the eventual bargaining range was between 90% 
and 100%. 
 
  Finally, the Council and the Parliament reached an agreement on 27 June 2008, by which 
the cap was set at 97% of the 2004-6 average, to fall to 95% in the second phase of the ETS 
between 2013 and 2020.
 42 This decision was roundly criticized by several NGOs, T and E, for 
example, calling it a “historic missed opportunity” that would prevent significant reductions of 
aviation emissions.
43  
 
  What kinds of flights should be covered by the ETS?  
 
  On consideration, the question of determining the kinds of flights to be subject to the ETS 
divides into two quite distinct questions applicable to particular cases. The first is a functional 
question - what is the purpose of the flight? The second is a question of geographical scope – is 
the flight, for instance, short-haul or long-haul, domestic or international? 
 
  The  Commission’s  answer  to  the  functional  question  was  that  only  commercial  air 
transport (whether carrying passengers or carrying freight) should be subject to the ETS rules, 
since,  among  all  forms  of  aviation,  commercial  aviation is  (in  aggregate)  by  far  the  largest 
polluter.  The Commission thus excluded military flights, rescue and other emergency flights, 
training and technical flights, most forms of recreational flying and flights by heads of state and 
government and government ministers. In subsequent discussion, the Commission’s proposal to 
                                                 
41 Quoted in ENDS Europe Daily (2007). 
42 Airlines could also use credits acquired from investment in environmental projects in developing 
countries through the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (which allowed industries covered by the 
ETS to use credits generated by underwriting environmental projects in developing countries).  
43 In making the decision, T and E remarked, the Member State governments had “once again [taken] the 
side of their flag-carrying airlines” (Joao Vieira, quoted in EurActiv.com. 2008B).  16 
 
restrict  application  of  the  ETS  rules  to  commercial  (passenger  and  cargo)  flights  raised  no 
objections, with one minor exception.
44  
   
  The question of geographical scope was more complicated and, moreover, had significant 
political ramifications. It required the Commission to decide whether ETS rules should apply to 
all  commercial  flights  using  EU  airports,  regardless  of  their  length,  whether  they  were  on 
domestic or international routes, and whether they were operated by EU or non-EU airlines. 
 
 
TABLE 1: INCLUSION OF AIR TRANSPORT IN E.T.S: PROPOSALS AND AMENDMENTS    
 
Body: 
 
 
 
Commission 
proposal: 
European 
Parliament: 
Environment 
Committee 
European 
Parliament: 
Transport 
Committee 
AEA  ELFAA  NGOs  June  
2008 
Dec 
2008. 
Topic: 
 
               
Gases covered     CO2 
   
     CO2 
 
   CO2 
 
 CO2 
 
 CO2 
 
CO2 
 
 CO2 
 
 CO2 
 
Accountable 
entity 
  Airline     Airline    Airline  Airline  Airline  Airline  Airline  Airline 
Flights 
covered 
All to and from 
EU airports 
All flights to 
and from EU 
airports 
All to and 
from EU 
airports 
All to 
and from 
EU 
airports 
All to 
and from 
EU 
airports 
All to 
and from 
EU 
airports 
All to 
and from 
EU 
airports 
All to 
and from 
EU 
airports 
Base year/s  2004-6  
Average 
    2008         
Cap    100%  50 or 75%  100%        97%, 
down to 
95% in 
2013-20 
 
Start date  (1)2010-11 for 
intra-EU flights; 
(2)2012 for all 
flights (intra- 
and extra-EU) 
      Single 
start date 
2010  2012   
Allocation 
procedure:  
Mix of free and 
auctioned 
             
(a)Free (%)  90% +    80%      Maximu
m of 
50% 
85%  85% 
(b)Auctioned 
(%) 
c.10% 
Unlimited from 
2013 
  50%  Parliament: 
25%; 
(European 
Council 
wanted 10% 
auctioned) 
      15%  15% 
Trading 
(open/ 
closed 
system) 
Open system: no  
purchase of 
aviation AAUs 
by firms in other 
industries 
        Closed    Open 
                                                 
44 The exception was a decision, initiated by some members of the Parliament’s Transport and Energy 
Committee, to remove flights by heads of state and government from the exempt category, on the ground 
that such exemption would be discriminatory and “elitist.”  17 
 
  On the question of distance, the Commission decided that the length of a flight was not in 
itself relevant to determining liability under ETS rules.  Since such liability depended on the 
amount of CO2 emitted, distance was relevant only in that a longer flight would cause more 
pollution (in aggregate) and entail greater liability than a shorter one.
45 
 
Regarding the routes for which CO2 liability would be assessed, the Commission opted 
for the simplest and most comprehensive formula available, namely, to apply the new rules to all 
commercial flights to and from airports within the EU. This definition was uncontroversial when 
applied to flights within the EU:  for purposes of regulating aviation, the distinction between 
“domestic” and “international” flights had effectively become obsolete with the establishment of 
the single market. 
 
But the inclusion of all commercial flights using EU airports entered legally-perilous 
territory because it necessarily involved flights from or to airports in non-EU countries, which 
were  sure  to  question  its  legality.    Such  a  definition  of  geographical  scope  would  also 
dramatically expand the reach of the ETS, compared to an “EU-only” definition: it would make 
even the longest of long-haul routes as subject to emission quotas as the shortest intra-EU trip (in 
fact,  the  two-minute  flight  from  Westray  to  Papa  Westray  in  Orkney).
46  Legally,  such  an 
interpretation would also raise questions about global (as distinct from national or regional) 
authority to frame rules on aircraft emissions, since it would implicitly override the division of 
labor defined by the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Assessing  liability  for  emissions  between  EU  and  non-EU  airports  would  require 
answering two further questions. First, should the ETS rules apply to all airlines, regardless of 
nationality? Secondly, what would be the appropriate distance to use in calculating liability - 
specifically, for what part of an international flight (and the related CO2 emissions) should the 
operator of the flight be liable? 
 
Regarding the first question, the Commission’s phrasing was quite unequivocal: absent 
explicit exclusion of non-EU airlines from liability, the rules would have to apply to all airlines, 
regardless  of  nationality.
47  Indeed,  if  the  Commission  had  exempted  non-EU  carriers  from 
accountability, the European airlines would have immediately protested about discrimination and 
distortion of  competition.
48 They would have complained that such exemption would put them 
at a serious economic disadvantage in competing with non-EU airlines and that they would 
therefore have to increase their fares on long-haul routes to take account of the carbon charges 
                                                 
45 However, the overall intensity of emissions is greater on shorter flights than on longer flights insofar as 
shorter flights entail more frequent landings and takeoffs.  But shorter flights are more efficient insofar as 
they involve a lower weight penalty from carriage of fuel than longer flights.     
46  The shortest documented time for this flight (achieved with a favorable wind) is 58 seconds. According 
to the Guinness Book of Records, this is also the shortest scheduled commercial flight in the world. 
47 The only flights to be exempted from liability under the ETS would be those passing through the 
airspace of Member States without landing - a very small proportion. 
48 This was a telling argument since the Commission had always argued that the ETS would not distort 
competition. 18 
 
not  borne  by  their  non-EU  rivals.
49  This  disadvantage  would  be  all  the  more  serious  since 
European “legacy” airlines operate by far the majority of long-haul flights to and from European 
cities and, indeed, depend on these flights for much of their revenue. Application of the ETS 
rules would therefore be much more costly for them than for their competitors.
50 
 
Determining the portion of a flight for which airlines should be liable required choosing 
between two radically different definitions (with radically different implications for emissions 
liability). One definition (the “routes-based” formula) would base liability for emissions on the 
entire distance flown between, say, New York and London (roughly 3,500 miles).  The other 
definition (the “airspace-based” formula) would use only the mileage flown through airspace 
above one or more Member States. On a New York – London flight, the distance on which 
liability for emissions would be based might therefore be as small as a couple of hundred miles 
or as large as 3,500 miles, depending on which formula was applied. 
  
  The Commission favored the “routes-based” formula – that involving the greater distance 
– for four reasons. The first (which may also be the most important in the minds of Commission 
officials)  was  that  the  “routes-based”  formula  “would  give  the  greatest  environmental 
benefits.”
51 Only a formula covering the entire distance of long-haul flights would capture these 
benefits and would (in the Commission’s words) “most adequately reflect the higher external 
costs associated with long-haul trips.”
52   
 
  The second reason was administrative practicality. According to the Commission, the 
“routes-based”  formula  would  be  far  easier  to  apply  than  an  “airspace-based”  formula  in 
assessing liability for carbon emissions. Applying an “airspace-based” formula would require 
finding out and recording each year the exact distance flown within the airspace of one or more 
Member States by every commercial flight en route to or from a third country.
53 The task of 
assembling  and  processing  such  data  would  be  immense.  The  “routes-based”  formula,  by 
contrast, could be applied simply by using standard city-to-city mileages (such as the 3,500 for 
London - New York). 
 
  Thirdly, the Commission claimed that its choice of the “routes-based” formula directly 
followed advice given in 1996 by the relevant committee of the United Nations Framework 
                                                 
49 The Commission has always assumed that all costs incurred by airlines as a result of participation in the 
ETS would be passed through to customers.  
50 This is a point that Commission officials have often used tactically in arguing with critics in the US and 
elsewhere. 
51 Specifically, the Commission’s working document  concluded  that:  
 
the broadest possible geographical scope of all departing and arriving flights would give the 
biggest environmental benefits, would be neutral from a competition point of view considering 
the alternative scope options and would be the best option for tourism. (Commission of the 
European Communities. 2006A, 64 (bold in original)). 
 
52 Commission of the European Communities (2006B, 12). 
53 Regulators would in fact have to collect information on every flight, since air traffic control centers 
may direct different flights on a common route to follow different courses, necessarily resulting in 
different mileages flown. 19 
 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
54 This committee had argued against basing carbon 
allowances  on  “emissions  generated  in  national  airspace.”  The  Commission,  following  this 
advice, had therefore ruled out an airspace-based approach “at an early stage.”
55 
 
  Fourthly,  the  Commission  in  its  original  proposals  and  subsequently has  consistently 
argued (following legal advice provided in Brussels) that a “routes-based” formula is consistent 
with international law and specifically with the Chicago Convention.  While insisting on the 
legality of its position, it also said when presenting its proposals  that it had no intention of 
challenging,  much  less  contravening,  the  provisions  of  the  Chicago  Convention.    Any 
appearance of such a challenge was, it implied, incidental and secondary.  
 
  In  subsequent  discussion,  most  of  the  organized  interests  in  the  EU  supported  the 
application of the ETS’s rules to all flights into and out of EU airports, but for different reasons. 
The environmental NGOs argued that to apply these rules only to intra-EU flights would, in the 
words of a Green Party MEP, “undermine the environmental integrity of the scheme” since 
between  75%  and  80%  of  the  mileage  flown  by  EU  airlines  is  on  long-haul  routes.
56  The 
Commission’s representatives made the same argument, using similar figures.
57  
 
  The EU airlines also accepted the Commission’s formula. ELFAA (the low-fare airline 
organization) was particularly opposed to restricting the ETS rules to intra-EU flights. Doing so 
(it  argued)  would  burden  its  members  disproportionately  since  they  fly  overwhelmingly  on 
routes within the EU: by contrast, “legacy” carriers, such as British Airways and Air France, rely 
(as noted above) much more on long-haul routes for their revenue.   
 
  The EU legacy carriers also accepted the logic of applying the ETS rules to all flights into 
and out of EU airports, provided that these rules were applied to airlines of all nationalities. 
Otherwise, the competitiveness of EU airlines would suffer since they would face costs and 
limitations greater than those borne by their foreign competitors.  The extra costs would, in turn, 
force them to charge higher fares than those charged by their rivals and they would lose business. 
 
  Non-EU governments, however, objected strenuously to both the Commission’s adoption 
of the “routes-based” formula and its application of the ETS rules to non-EU airlines using 
European  airports.  Predictably,  they  saw  in  these  decisions  an  improper  extraterritorial 
application of EU law and an encroachment on their sovereignty over aircraft on their national 
registers.  In  particular,  they  referred  to  the  prohibition  of  taxes  and  similar  charges  on 
international flights contained in the Chicago Convention, arguing that the ETS legislation’s 
provision for buying carbon allowances breached this provision.  For the non-EU states, the 
Commission’s claim that it had never intended to challenge the Chicago Convention was beside 
                                                 
54 Specifically, the committee on scientific and technological advice. 
55 Commission of the European Communities (2006A, 11). 
56 The speaker was Caroline Lucas (see also Lucas 2008). Transport and Environment calculated that 
intra-EU flights generated only 50 million tons of CO2 per annum, whereas the total for all flights arriving 
at and departing from EU airports was roughly 200 million tons (Transport and Environment 2006).     
57 John Bruton, the EU ambassador to the US, pointed out in May 2008 that “two thirds of emissions 
come from intercontinental flights, and only one third from internal European flights” (European Union. 
Delegation of the European Commission to the US, 2008).  20 
 
the point.  The provisions of international law on commercial aviation were to them clear and 
fundamental:  they  could  not  be  overridden  simply  in  order  to  advance  EU  policy,  however 
urgent (and global) might be the problems addressed by such policy.  
 
  When should aviation become subject to the ETS? 
 
  On the timing of aviation’s inclusion in the ETS, the Commission originally  proposed 
that implementation should occur in two phases. In the first, to occur in 2010/2011, the emissions 
scheme would apply only to intra-EU flights: in the second, to occur in 2012, it would apply to 
all  commercial  flights  using  airports  in  the  EU.  The  Commission  argued  that  a  two-phase 
approach would give it and the Member States a year to gain experience in implementing the 
new rules before they had to deal with the much larger volume of traffic that would face them 
under the “all flights into and out of EU airports” formula. 
 
  Debate about a starting date for inclusion of aviation in the ETS mainly focused on two 
issues: first, the desirability of a phased introduction of the ETS and, second, the actual year or 
years when it would be introduced.  
  
  Criticism of the two-phase approach came mainly from two groups, the environmental 
activists  (along  with  Green  Party  and  other  members  of  the  Parliament)  and  the  low-cost 
airlines.
58 But the reasons for their preferences differed substantially. The environmental NGOs 
and  the  Greens  wanted  a  single  starting-date  because,  regardless  of  what  year  was  chosen, 
adoption of such a date would mean that long-haul flights would become liable for emissions at 
the same time as intra-EU (and shorter)  flights – for them, a desirable change, given the greater 
pollution caused by long-haul flights. 
 
  The low-cost airlines, by contrast, were worried that a two-phase approach would distort 
competition  if  only  intra-EU  flights  were  covered  by  the  first  phase.
59  Such  an  approach 
(ELFAA argued) would discriminate against airlines flying largely or exclusively within the EU 
(as the low-costs do). For an entire year (2010-11), they would be fully liable for CO2 emissions 
and subject to the related restrictions and costs of the ETS on all their routes, while airlines (EU 
or non-EU) operating long-haul services to and from non-EU states would escape liability for 
such services.
60 
 
  Worse still, since many of the airlines operating long-haul services also flew on intra-
European routes, they would be able during the transitional year to cross-subsidize their intra-EU 
services with revenue from long-haul services. More precisely, they would be able to apply the 
savings they made because of exemption from the ETS to reduce the costs of (and the fares for) 
                                                 
58 The non-EU member states of ICAO also objected to phasing-in. But they objected to the legislation 
itself because it ignored ICAO’s mandate and because the Commission intended to apply it to their 
airlines. 
59 The large number of regional airlines would, of course, have similar interests.  
60 Accordingly, ELFAA argued, under a phased approach “long-haul airlines, who are the biggest 
polluters, would not have to pay the cost of their emissions”(ELFAA 2008A). 
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their  intra-EU  flights.  The  low-costs  therefore  argued  that  the  proposed  phasing-in  would 
necessarily distort competition on intra-European routes.
61  
 
  Even if the EU dropped phasing-in, it would still have to decide on the actual date for 
implementation.  The  environmental  NGOs  and  the  Parliament’s  environmental  committee 
favored not only a single date, but also an early one – typically, 2010. The low-costs did not have 
especially  strong  views  about  the  date  to  be  chosen,  provided  that  it  applied  to  all  airlines 
operating within EU airspace.  
  
  After  argument  within  and  outside  the  Parliament,  the  two-phase  approach  was 
abandoned in favor of a single start-date for all flights – specifically, 1 January 2012. 
 
  How should carbon allowances be allocated? 
 
  Allocation  of  carbon  allowances  to  airlines  under  the  new  legislation  involves  three 
stages. One is the collection of data on emissions by the airlines of individual Member States. 
The second is application of a formula for determining the level of allowances to be allocated to 
each airline, starting from its average emissions in the 2004-6 reference period. The third is 
applying a formula for making these allowances available to the airlines (for free, for a charge or 
through auction, or through some combination of procedures). 
  
  The first – essentially administrative - step requires each Member State to report in a 
National Allocation Plan the total CO2 emissions of its airlines in the reference period (as well as 
those  of  non-EU  airlines  for  which  it  would  be  responsible).
62  The  Commission  will  then 
determine the number of AAUs to be made available to each airline, while prescribing how they 
will be made available. 
 
  The  Commission  reviewed  several  alternative  formulas  for  distribution  of  AAUs,  as 
follows: 
 
(1)  “Grandfathering,”  by  which  each  airline  would  receive  a  free  allocation  of  allowances 
exactly  equal  to  the  emissions  produced  by  its  aircraft  in  the  reference  period.  The 
Commission rejected this option because it would give the least possible incentive to airlines 
to improve their efficiency and thereby reduce their emissions.
63 
 
                                                 
61 Understandably, the low-costs were absolutely opposed to the proposal occasionally heard for an even 
longer introductory period (say, five years) during which only intra-European flights would be subject to 
emissions control. They feared that, because of inertia, “ultimately there would only be an intra-EU 
scheme [which] would be a ridiculous result” (ELFAA 2008A). 
62 See note 36 above. This responsibility would also entail administering the allowances subsequently 
allocated to the designated non-EU carriers. The legislation applies the term “attributed aviation 
emissions” to emissions by aircraft of non-EU airlines and labels those of EU-based aircraft as “historic 
aviation emissions” (those for the period 2004 -2006) (Commission of the European Communities 2006B, 
Ch.1, (2), (q) and (r)). 
63 Indeed, the Commission remarked that this approach could be seen “as rewarding the polluter” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006A, 20).  22 
 
(2) “Benchmarking,” by which each airline would receive a free allocation of allowances equal 
to its 2004-6 average modified by a benchmarking formula that would reward efficient and 
less polluting operations.
64  
 
  The Commission’s proposed formula for benchmarking involved a formula that would 
give credit for actual payloads carried (to reward efficient use of aircraft) and for taking the 
shortest  routes  on  its  flights.  This  formula  would  then  be  applied  to  a  figure  for  total 
transportation as measured in ton/kilometers (so as to avoid discriminating between short-haul 
and long-haul flights). The effect of applying such a formula would be that an airline which was 
or became more efficient and less polluting would “receive proportionately more allowances as 
compared to its needs than an aircraft operator which [was] less efficient than average.”
65 
 
(3) Mixture of freely-allocated and auctioned allowances, in which each airline would receive a 
proportion  of  its  “historic”  emissions  free  and  would  be  allowed  to  bid  for  allowances 
retained and auctioned by the Commission; 
 
(4) Auctioning of all allowances (and therefore no free distribution). This option (preferred by 
some environmental organizations) was rejected by the Commission. 
 
  The Commission originally recommended adopting option (3), with each Member State 
authorized  to  determine  the  percentage  of  AAUs  that  its  airlines  would  receive  free  and 
(therefore) the percentage that would be put up for auction. The Member States would schedule 
the auctions and decide on the number of AAUs to be sold at each auction. They would receive 
the revenue from auctions, but the Commission in its initial proposals recommended that they 
should use this revenue “to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change, to fund research and development for mitigation and adaptation, and to cover the costs 
of administering the scheme.”
 66 
 
  In the extended debate about formulas for determining and allocating allowances, the 
airlines and the environmental organizations (along with their parliamentary sympathizers) once 
again took radically different positions. 
  
  The airlines wanted straightforward “grandfathering,” with all - or a very large proportion 
- of the carbon allowances provided to them free. Conversely, they were against any auctioning 
of allowances because (the Secretary General of ELFAA argued) “auctioning would simply be 
an additional tax without any environmental benefit.” 
67 It would increase the costs of an industry 
that was already weighed down by a variety of charges and taxes. Secondly, while increasing the 
costs of doing business (and putting more money in government treasuries), auctioning of carbon 
                                                 
64 Use of such a formula would, the Commission believed, give “environmental credibility” to the ETS:  
“A benchmarking system [it said] should incentivize companies to deliver a good or service in a less 
carbon intensive manner” (Commission of the European Communities 2006A, 62).   
65 Commission of the European Communities (2006A, 61-62). 
66 Commission of the European Communities (2006B, 13 and Article 3c). But the legislation, as amended, 
provides only that the proceeds of auctioning will go to the exchequer of the auctioning state. 
67 Quoted in ELFAA (2008A). 
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allowances might, ironically, cause airlines to postpone buying newer and less polluting aircraft.  
It would reduce the profitability of airlines and would require them to divert money intended for 
purchase of new aircraft to paying instead for carbon allowances.  
 
  The NGOs and their parliamentary allies, on the other hand, favored formulas that would 
both lower the overall level of AAUs offered to the airlines and reduce the proportion they would 
receive  free.  Consequently,  the  NGOs  completely  rejected  “grandfathering,”  arguing  that  it 
would remove any incentive to (and pressure on) the airlines to operate more efficiently. Further, 
they recommended reducing the number and proportion of free allowances, arguing that the 
availability of such allowances would (as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in 
London put it) give the airlines “a cheap flight.”
68 
 
  The NGOs were especially skeptical about giving free allowances to the airlines not only  
because of the environmental implications of doing so but also because of experience in the first 
phase of the ETS when some energy companies had gamed the system in order to make windfall 
profits. They had been able to do so because Member States had initially made over-generous 
allocation of carbon allowances to the energy sector, inadvertently enabling energy companies to 
profit by selling allowances that were surplus to their needs.
69 
 
  The moral was clearly that, in dealing with aviation, the Commission should restrict and, 
if  possible,  eliminate  opportunities  for  the  gaming  of  ETS  procedures  by  restricting  -  and, 
ideally, eliminating – the allocation of free carbon allowances to the airlines.  Otherwise, the 
IPPR estimated, the airlines would stand to make windfall profits of around £ 2.7 billion (then €4 
billion).
70 Even if they still needed to buy further credits in the market, they would simply pass 
on the marginal costs of these credits by raising fares (as the Commission always assumed they 
would do).
  
 
  The NGOs therefore pressed for a formula with the highest possible ratio of auctioned to 
free allowances (or, best of all, a formula that completely excluded free allowances).  Both 
Transport and Environment and the World Wildlife Fund argued for auctioning 100% of the 
AAUs because this procedure was “the most efficient and fairest way to issue permits,” would 
remove the possibility of windfall profits and would produce revenue that might be applied to 
developing green technology.
71  
 
                                                 
68 Institute for Public Policy Research (2006B), quoted in EurActiv (2006).  
69 In the UK, energy companies had made windfall profits of approximately £1 billion in the first year of 
their inclusion in ETS. Figures issued in 2006 showed that actual CO2 emissions by these companies were 
44 million tons under the level permitted by the initial allocation of free allowances in 2005.  
70 Institute for Public Policy and Research (2006A and B). A World Wildlife Fund study had earlier 
estimated that the airlines might make as much as €3.5 billion per annum from their inclusion in the ETS 
(cited in EurActiv.com, 2006). The airlines denied that any such windfall profits would be possible. 
ELFAA, indeed, commissioned a consultant’s analysis on this issue after a consultant for the UK 
government had forecast that airlines would make significant windfall profits from the ETS. The ELFAA 
consultant’s report criticized the methodology of the UK study (see Frontier Economics 2008 and Vivid 
Economics 2007 and 2008). 
71 Transport and Environment (2006). 24 
 
  While the Member States (through the Council of Ministers) supported auctioning only 
10%  of  the  carbon  allowances,  the  environment  committee  of  the  Parliament  twice 
recommended a 50% figure (some members arguing (like the NGOs) for the auctioning of all 
allowances). Both the Green Party and the socialist PSE bloc insisted that 50% should be the 
minimum  proportion  auctioned,  one  Green  Party  MEP  declaring  that  it  was  time  for  the 
Parliament “to get tough with the aviation sector.”
72  
 
  Faced with a warning by the committee’s rapporteur that the Member States would never 
accept 50% auctioning, the environment committee eventually settled for recommending that 
25% of the allowances should be auctioned in the first year. But it further recommended that the 
proportion of allowances auctioned should rise progressively between 2013 and 2020, by which 
time the airlines would have to buy all their carbon allowances at auction (as the Commission 
was recommending for the other industries covered by the ETS).
73  
 
  While the Parliament and the Council of Ministers agreed in June 2008 that only 15% of 
allowances should be auctioned, the EU airlines were outraged that any double-digit figures were 
being  considered.
74  They  had  seen  even  the  10%  figure  recommended  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers as “unfairly punitive” and they were naturally appalled by the decision to raise it to 
15%.
75  The airlines complained that auctioning would increase their costs immensely, just as the 
industry was facing a steep rise in the price of aviation fuel, with several airlines already on (or 
already over) the edge of bankruptcy.
76 Sylviane Lust, the director-general of the International 
Air Carrier Association (representing leisure and charter airlines), declared that the 15% figure 
was  “unaffordable  and  unacceptable.”    ELFAA,  for  its  part,  was  “shocked”  by  the  June 
agreement. It accused the EU of having “traduced” the principles of the ETS in order to impose 
“the biggest ever tax in aviation history”: by requiring the airlines to buy so many allowances, 
Brussels had in effect “turned a green initiative into a straight tax.” The industry had expected - 
because of the decision to set the cap at 97% of the baseline amount – that it would have to buy 
only three per cent of its allowances (if a “grandfathering” formula was adopted): now it saw that 
proportion increasing fivefold. 
  
  The airlines were therefore relieved when further negotiation between the Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers in December 2008 led to an agreement that the environmentalists saw as 
a significant capitulation to the airlines.
77 The agreement rejected the environment committee’s 
recommendation that the airlines (along with other industries covered by the ETS) should have to 
buy  through  auction  an  increasing  proportion  of  their  allowances  in  the  2013-2020  period. 
Instead, the proportion of allowances to be auctioned would remain at 15% (the proposal for 
                                                 
72 Caroline Lucas, quoted in Mahony (2008). 
73 In October 2008, on the second reading of the proposed ETS rules, the  environment committee 
returned to the charge, voting for an increase in auctioning  up to 20% in 2013, with (as already agreed) a 
complete phasing out of free allowances by 2020. 
74 In June 2008, the Parliament and the Council also agreed to drop the requirement that Member States 
invest any revenue from auctioning in “green” projects. 
75 ELFAA (2008A).  
76 The price had risen by 140% between December 2006 and June 2008 and (ELFAA pointed out) some 
twenty airlines had already declared bankruptcy in the first six months of the year. 
77 Dunn (2009). 25 
 
allowing each Member State to determine its own level of auctioning having been dropped). In 
greeting the new agreement as a victory for common sense, ELFAA justifiably commented that 
the EU had effectively established “a separate scheme for aviation in the ETS.”
78  
 
  The  environmental  organizations,  by  contrast,  were  disappointed  by  the  continuing 
dilution of the provisions for auctioning (as they had been disappointed by a decision in June to 
drop  the  requirement  that  Member  States  should  use  any  revenue  from  auctioning  for 
environmental projects).  Friends of the Earth spoke for many of the NGOs when it commented 
that the compromise reached in December was so weak that "it [would] have little impact on the 
rocketing growth in carbon dioxide pollution from flying.”
79 
 
  How should airlines conduct trading in carbon allowances?  
 
  A key issue for the Commission in devising rules for carbon trading by airlines was to 
define the market in which trading might occur. Specifically, would airlines be allowed to trade 
only in a “closed system” (one in which buyers and sellers could only exchange allowances 
allotted originally to airlines)? Or would they be permitted to trade in the broader carbon market 
created when the ETS was first established (that is, trading in surplus allowances originally 
allocated to all industries covered by the scheme)?  
 
  This choice of market was crucial because everyone involved agreed that the airlines 
would have to buy carbon allowances even to maintain their present level of operations (and 
many thought that the industry would always need to buy a very large number of allowances).  
So the scope of the relevant carbon market and the rules governing transactions in it would be 
very important in determining how seriously the ETS affected the growth and profitability of the 
airline industry. If the Commission chose a closed system, the supply of surplus allowances 
would be either zero or very small, and the price of any allowances available would be very 
high.
80 If, however, the Commission chose an open system – one in which the airlines would be 
allowed to buy surplus allowances offered by firms in other industries - the supply of allowances 
would probably be much larger and (other things being equal) prices would be much lower. 
81  
 
  In its original proposals, the Commission firmly advocated an open system for aviation 
on  three  grounds.    First,  aviation  could  not  sustain  a  viable  market  on  its  own.  Secondly, 
                                                 
78 ELFAA (2008B). ELFAA also commented (wrongly) that the December agreement would “make the 
EU ETS more saleable to third countries, whose participation in EU ETS [would be] essential for it to be 
environmentally effective” (ELFAA 2009). 
79 Richard Draper, quoted in EurActiv.com (2008C).  
80 The Commission suggested that in a closed system for aviation, the price of a ton of carbon would 
probably reach between €114.1 and €325.8 (roughly $171 and $489, respectively) by 2020 (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2006A, 40). Current prices in the open market are in the range €19-€23 per 
ton (roughly, $28.5 and $34.5, respectively). 
81 Observers also agreed that the entry of the airlines into the carbon market would probably have little 
impact on prices, simply because the industry is a fairly small part of the total EU economy (producing 
only about 0.6 per cent of value-added in the economy (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006A, 6). The Commission had calculated that at 2005 levels of emission, air transport would contribute 
extra emissions equivalent to only eight per cent of the CO2 emitted by the industries already covered by 
the ETS.  26 
 
regardless of conditions in specific industries, an open system would lead to more efficient use of 
available  carbon  allowances.  Thirdly,  including  aviation  in  an  open  system  would  (the 
Commission believed) make it easier to reach international agreement on controlling aviation 
emissions  than  if  it  were  put  into  a  closed  system.  In  fact,  ICAO  had  already  decided  that 
“international open emissions trading” would be better for commercial aviation than a closed 
system. So allowing EU airlines to trade in the open carbon market would make it easier to 
accommodate the EU’s regional emissions scheme to any eventual ICAO global scheme (should 
it ever offer one).
82 
 
  But the Commission prescribed specific conditions for carbon trading by the airlines. 
While they would be able to buy carbon allowances from the general pool within the ETS, 
“operators  from  other  sectors  [would]  not  be  permitted  to  surrender  [that  is,  buy]  aviation 
allowances.”  Conversely,  airlines  would  not  be  allowed  to  sell  allowances  from  their  own 
allocation  to  companies  outside  the  industry.
83  In  effect,  the  Commission  (as  it  noted)  had 
created a “one-way gate”: airlines might buy emission allowances originally allotted to other 
industries, but these industries would be excluded from buying allowances originally allotted to 
the airlines. 
 
  On the issue of an appropriate carbon market for trading by airlines, the industry and its 
critics again took diametrically opposed positions. The airlines consistently favored an open 
trading  system  because  it  would  give  them  a  chance  to  continue  growing.    Conversely, the 
environmentalists  (and  the  Parliament’s  environment  committee)  favored  a  closed  system 
precisely  because  it  would  slow  down  such  growth:  the  high  prices  (and  small  supply)  of 
allowances within a closed system would force the airlines to raise their fares substantially and 
perhaps  even  reduce  their  flights.
84  As  a  result,  demand  would  level  off  or  even  fall  and 
emissions would be contained or even reduced.
85  
 
  Some environmentalists went further, arguing that successful abatement would require 
putting a cap on the number of allowances that airlines, individually or collectively, would be 
allowed to buy.
86 Otherwise, the airlines would simply raise fares to match the cost of purchasing 
allowances. Raising fares might or might not reduce demand, depending on the route and the 
type of passenger concerned.  Given such uncertainty, therefore, the surest (and perhaps the 
only) way to ensure containment of emissions would be to impose a limit on the number of 
allowances that an airline might buy.  
                                                 
82 An open system would be “economically more efficient” because a single overall price for carbon 
would  enable all market participants to make gains from trade and allow the EU to meet its goals for CO2 
“at minimum cost across all the covered sectors ”(Commission of the European Communities, 2006A, 
40).  
83 Commission of the European Communities (2006A, 17).  
84 As Jean-Cyrille Spinetta of Air France put it (rather opaquely), a closed system would not be “adapted 
to the context of the air transport sector” (meaning apparently that it would impede the industry’s growth) 
(quoted in EurActiv.com.2008A). 
85 T and E also invoked a more economic argument, suggesting that a closed system was desirable “for 
reasons of effectiveness and cost effectiveness” (Transport and Environment 2006). 
86 One member of the environment committee also suggested that purchase of allowances in the carbon 
market should be made conditional on an airline having already met a specified minimum level of fuel 
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  However, the eventual legislation contained very few of the NGOs’ recommendations. 
Instead, the Parliament and the Council agreed with the Commission that the airlines should be 
allowed to trade without restriction within the open carbon market (subject to the provisions for 
“one-way” trading in the original proposals). 
 
 
6. Prospects for reducing aviation emissions:  
 
  Before and since its adoption, critics have criticized the EU’s new emissions regime for 
aviation on legal, political and economic grounds. The non-EU members of ICAO (most vocally, 
the United States) claim that it contravenes the Chicago Convention by presuming to impose an 
illegal charge based on liability for emissions on their airlines whenever they fly to and from EU 
airports.
87 They also claim that the EU, by creating a regional scheme for aviation emissions, has 
usurped the mandate given to ICAO under the Kyoto Protocol. IATA has repeatedly warned that 
implementation  of  the  ETS  rules  will  (in  the  words  of  its  director-general)  “only  invite 
international legal battles.”
 88 Finally, the US government and the US airline industry (the latter 
through the Air Transport Association (ATA)) have reacted quite polemically to the ETS and, 
more broadly, have so far rejected “cap-and-trade” as an appropriate instrument for reducing 
aircraft emissions. 
 
  Environmental activists and NGOs have, meanwhile, criticized the emissions scheme as a 
political compromise that will have no serious impact on the growth of aircraft emissions (a view 
shared by some economists).
89 Some critics are skeptical of the very principle of “cap-and-trade” 
(because, they believe, it implicitly legitimizes pollution). But critics more commonly complain 
that, whether because of omission or dilution, the ETS lacks elements that, for purposes of 
effective abatement, are crucial.  
 
  Such elements usually include (in different combinations) the following:  
 
(1) a lower overall cap;  
(2) lower initial allocations of carbon allowances;  
(3) a much higher proportion of auctioned as against freely-given allowances;  
(4) a separate (closed) trading scheme for aviation; and  
(5) a cap on the number of allowances that individual airlines are permitted to buy and/or a 
requirement that airlines meet a specified level of abatement as a precondition for buying 
allowances.  
                                                 
87 The articles of the Convention usually cited in this discussion are Articles 15 (dealing with airport 
charges) and 24 (dealing with customs duties). Critics of the legislation claim that emissions charges are 
sufficiently similar to such charges and duties that their imposition will breach one or both of these 
articles. Other legal analysts (including those advising the Commission) argue that emissions charges are 
entirely different in character from the charges envisaged in the Chicago Convention and are therefore 
permissible as long as they are levied “in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to nationality” (such 
non-discrimination being a major value in the Convention) (Petersen 2008, 201-2). 
88 Giovanni Bisignani, quoted in EUobserver.com (2008). 
89  For two recent analyses concluding that the impact of  the ETS will be quite modest: see, for example, 
Mendes and Santos (2008, 204) and Scheelhaase and Grimme (2007, 262).  28 
 
  Only by such means (and perhaps by the imposition of en route or other charges) – the 
critics argue - will the cost of emissions (both for airlines and passengers) begin to meet or 
exceed  the  (already  high)  costs  of  abatement,  thereby  encouraging  the  industry  to  be  more 
efficient and would-be passengers (and users of airfreight services) to be more frugal about air 
travel. 
 
  The  EU  airlines,  for  their  part,  have  accepted  pragmatically  (and  in  some  cases, 
embraced)  trading  as  the  least  bad  alternative,  compared  to  taxes  and  other  command-and-
control  measures.  Even  in  bowing  to  this  pressure,  however,  the  airline  industry  (like  its 
American counterpart) insists that technological and operational measures informed by its own 
expertise and under its own control offer the surest, most efficient, most productive and least 
costly way to control aircraft emissions.  
 
  However, EU officials and the majority of MEPs are clearly convinced that inclusion of 
aviation in the ETS and the overall policy it serves are necessary and imperative in the fight 
against global warming. Indeed, they claim that the rules they have developed can “serve as a 
model for the expansion of the scheme worldwide.”
90 Caught between the unanimous opposition 
of  the  ICAO  members  outside  Europe  and  pressure  at  home  from  increasingly  strident 
environmental organizations, they show no inclination to defer to the ICAO majority, including 
the US.  
 
  Moreover, if forced to state their priority among the three commitments recognized in the 
drafting of the ETS – containment of emissions, equal treatment of EU and non-EU airlines, and 
uncritical compliance with the Chicago Convention  – Commission officials might well decide 
(as  Green  MEPs  and  the  environmental  NGOs  have  obviously  long  since  decided)  that 
preventing climate change comes first, and does so by a long way. As an official in Brussels 
remarked to the author about the airline industry and its sympathizers (and did so with some 
impatience): “Look, these people have got to understand that protecting the environment comes 
before everything else. It’s got to.”  
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